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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: STATE ACTION V. PRIVATE ACTION-
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SELF-HELP
REPOSSESSION PROVISIONS (9-503, 9-504)-Do NOT
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Adams v. Southern California First National Bank
UCC SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 (9th Cir. 1973)
EVERAL YEARS AGO, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,' signaled what has been eventually interpreted
in subsequent decisions as the strict measurement of creditors' rights
against the requirements of due process set forth in the fourteenth
amendment. What has since transpired has been an onslaught of litigation
in this area of such magnitude that the due process requirements of prior
notice and hearing found in Sniadach have been extended to virtually all
forms of prejudgment remedies available to the aggrieved creditor.
2
Despite all of this, the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Adams v. Southern California First National Bank
3 
evidences
an emerging view 4 that limits the vague scope of Sniadach, distinguishes
peaceful self-help repossession from summary procedures involving state
action, and concludes that repossession under the Uniform Commercial
Code is constitutionally sound.
ISniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Sniadach].
2 Post-Sniadach decisions considering due process requirements for various summary
procedures include, in part: Replevin: Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Garnishment: Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc.,
286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis.2d 712, 172
N.W.2d 20 (1969); Confession of Judgment: Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972);
D. H. Overmeyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Imposition of Landlord's Lien:
Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Sale of Goods Destrained for Rent:
Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Attachment: Randone v.
Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971),
cert. denied 407 U.S. 924 (1972). Termination of Welfare Payments: Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
3 Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub. nom., Adams v.
Southern California First Natl. Bank, CCH SEc. TRANs. GUmE 52,216 (9th Cir.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Adams].
4 Accord, Colvin v. Avco Financial Services, Inc., 12 UCC RaP. SERv. 25 (D. Utah
1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene v. First Natl.
Exchange Bank of Virginia, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oler v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Natl. Bank of
Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121
N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
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Sniadach and Fuentes: Solving and Posing Problems
In order to appreciate fully the rationale and significance of Adams,
a brief examination of the recent developments in this area of law is
important. In 1969, the Sniadach decision revealed that the Supreme
Court would view at least some deprivations of property pending
judgment as violating due process. In that case, the Court found a
prejudgment garnishment of wages made pursuant to a Wisconsin statute
unconstitutional and that no such remedy could be constitutionally
invoked absent prior notice and hearing. The Court was significantly
influenced by the harsh effect of garnishment and its imposition of a
"tremendous hardship on wage-earners ' 5 which, as a practical matter,
served to drive "a wage-earning family to the wall."6 Unhappily, Sniadach
may well have created more problems than it solved. Although the
decision evidenced a willingness by the Court to find certain forms of
prejudgment remedies unconstitutional, due to some rather unfortunate
language in the majority opinion,7 the intended scope of the Sniadach
holding was left open for judicial speculation.8
Any uncertainties as to the breadth of Sniadach seemed to be
dispelled by the Court's recent decision in Fuentes v. Shevin.9 Decided
three years after Sniadach, Fuentes considers the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes, there used summarily to
repossess various consumer goods purchased under conditional sales
contracts. Refusing to construe Sniadach narrowly, the majority in
Fuentes stated that due process protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment was not limited to specialized types of property, such as wages,
referred to in Sniadach, but that "[a]ny significant taking of property by
the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause."' 10
5 395 U.S. at 340.
61d. at 341-42.
7 Speaking for the majority in Sniadach, Mr. Justice Douglas referred to the problem
in that case as follows: "We deal here with wages-a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system." 395 U.S. at 340.8 Lower court decisions in later cases dealing with other forms of prejudgment rem-
edies often viewed M. Justice Douglas' language in Sniadach as intentionally limiting.See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Reeves
v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black Watch Farms,
Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp.1308 (D.D.C. 1970). Conversely, some courts interpreted Sniadach as a broad
indictment of all summary creditor remedies. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't ofSuper. Ct., 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924(1971); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Santiago v. McElroy, 319
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis.2d 712, 172 N.W.2d
20 (1969).
9407 U.S. 67 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fuentes].
10 Id. at 86.
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In dissent, three Justices" accentuated the practical "dollar and cents
considerations" of the majority decision. Believing that Fuentes would not
extend additional protection to the wronged consumer buying on credit,
but would only precipitate a flood of tenuous defenses by defaulting
debtors, the dissenters were unable to concur with the "ideological tinker-
ing of state law"12 which they felt would only make credit to low-income
consumers either prohibitively expensive or simply unavailable.
13
Although Fuentes did much to clarify the rationale and scope of
Sniadach, problems in the development of this area of law still remain.
14
And one of a significant and reoccurring nature is framed within Adams:
Does peaceful self-help repossession which is authorized under the Code
qualify as "state action," thus invoking the protection of due process
under the fourteenth amendment?
Adams: Is Self-Help Repossession State Action?
In the instant case,15 respondent George Adams (hereinafter buyer)
executed a security agreement in favor of the appellant Southern
California First National Bank (hereinafter bank) to cover the purchase
price of a motor vehicle. After the buyer's subsequent default and in
accordance with the contractual provision allowing the bank to take
possession of the vehicle under the California version of the Code or other
applicable law pursuant to default, the bank repossessed the automobile
through a collection agency and sold it at private sale.
11 Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun
join, dissented in Fuentes, a 4-3 decision. Newly appointed Court members, Mr.
'Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, did not participate in any aspect of the
Fuentes decision.
12 407 U.S. at 99-102.
13 Id. at 99-102.
14 See generally, e.g., Black, Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and Cali-
fornia's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Clark & Landers, Sniadach,
Fuentes, and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 U. VA. L. REv. 355
(1973); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for State Action Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); McDonnell, Sniadach, The Replevin Cases and Self-
Help Repossession-Due Process Tokenism? 14 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. REv. 437
(1973); Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Constitutional Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 767 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Mentschikoff]; Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 347 (1963).
15 Two cases were consolidated for trial: In Adams v. Egley, the executed security
agreement provided for the right of the creditor to take possession of the collateral
under the California Commercial Code "or other applicable law" in the event of
default. In the companion case, Posadas v. Star & Crescent Federal Credit Union, the
executed security agreement provided for repossession according to law.
RECENT CASESWinter, 1974]
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The buyer, alleging federal question jurisdiction,' then brought suit
in U.S. District Court against the bank asserting that California Commer-
cial Code sections 9503 and 9504 (Code sections 9-503 and 9-504)
violate due process of law by providing for repossession and disposition
of the collateral by a secured party without prior notice or hearing.17
Claiming that the relevant legislation enumerating prejudgment remedies
reflects a state policy significantly encouraging self-help repossession, the
buyer urged the conclusion that summary repossession in accordance
with the relevant Code sections constitutes action under "color of state
law" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.' 8 Consequently, it
was argued, the failure to afford the buyer notice and hearing prior
to repossession rendered the bank civilly liable within the scope of
42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Conversely, Southern California First National Bank challenged the
district court's jurisdiction on the ground that no state action or action
under color of state law could be shown. Arguing that its right to repossess
and dispose of the collateral arises from the private security agreement
whose default provisions are self-executing, the bank drew a distinction
16 Federal question jurisdiction is raised under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and under the
Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Section 1331(a)
confers jurisdiction on the district courts over any civil action which "... . arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." Section 1343(3)
provides that the district courts have jurisdiction over any civil action "ftlo
redress the deprivation, under color of any state law.., of any right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the CoNsTrTON OF THE UNITED STATES...." Compare Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (discussion of rights protected
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 extending civil
liability to one who deprives another of "[any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution....") with McCormick v. First Natl. Bank of Miami, 322
F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) applies to personal liberty, not
property rights).
17 CCH SEc. TRANS GumE 52,216 at 67,308 (9th Cir. 1973). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-503 provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take posses-
sion of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed withoutjudicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceedby action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require
the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party
at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient
to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 9-504.
§ 9-504 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially
reasonable preparation or processing....
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must
account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless otherwise agreed, the debtor
is liable for any deficiency....
18 CCH SEC. TRANS. GuIDE 52,216 at 67,308 (9th Cir. 1973). Section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment provides: "[N]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiCtiop the equal proteCtion of the laws,"
[Vol. 7:2
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between (1) the significant state action evidenced in certain forms
of prejudgment seizure such as garnishment, claim and delivery, and
replevin, solely dependent upon statutory authorization and admittedly
within the scope of the fourteenth amendment, and (2) the private act
of repossession which is a common-law self-help prejudgment remedy
performed without the aid of any state official and thus not bound
by the requirements of due process.
The district court refused to make such a distinction. In awarding
partial summary judgment to the buyer, the trial court concluded that
state enactment of the California Commercial Code and its accompanying
authorization of self-help repossession constituted sufficient state action to
invoke the constitutional protection of due process. 19 In justifying its
ultimate conclusion, the lower court felt compelled to endow the Sniadach
holding with a broad construction. Viewing Sniadach as a cornerstone for
the renewed protection of debtors' rights, the district court interpreted
that case as "a return of 'the entire domain of prejudgment remedies to
the long-standing procedural due process principle which dictates that
except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual may not be deprived
of his life, liberty, or property without notice and hearing.' "20
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,"
holding that self-help repossession authorized under state legislation was
not an act under the color of state law and not, therefore, state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.2 2 In reaching its
decision, the appellate court proved willing to make the distinction which
the district court would not; namely, that although certain actions by
private individuals may be considered state action or action under the
"color of law" when significant state involvement exists, acts within
the instant case constituting a summary seizure of personal property,
taken by private creditors in accordance with the provisions of a
consensual agreement, without any direct action or review by state
officials lack significant state involvement and thus are private in nature.
23
Rejecting the rationale embraced by the district court, the appellate court
classified the assessment of state involvement in private actions as a
determination not susceptible to a single, inflexible test: "Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.
' ' 24 Having
19 338 F. Supp. at 618.
20 Id. quoting Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal.3d 536, 547, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 715, 488, P.2d 13, 19 (1971), cert. denied 407 U.S. 924 (1972).
21 Adams v. Southern California First Natl. Bank, CCH SEc. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216
(9th Cir. 1973).
22 Id. at 67,309.
23 id.
24 Id. quoting, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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recognized the inherent difficulty not only in formulating a workable
test for the evaluation of state action in private conduct but also in
applying any such test on a case-by-case basis, the appellate court
could not classify as controlling any "state action" guidelines set forth
in earlier Supreme Court decisions.
First, the Ninth Circuit was able to distinguish Reitman v. Mulkey,25
a decision found to be controlling at the district court level. In that case it
was held that a state constitutional amendment prohibiting the state from
denying the right of any person to decline to sell, lease, or rent property
to any person at his discretion was sufficient state action to invoke the
constitutional guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Thus action by
private entities complying with this provision was within the purview of
the fourteenth amendment. Nonetheless, Reitman was found not on point.
(1) The Adams court could not justify the extension of the Reitman
rationale which recognized significant state involvement in the authoriza-
tion of personal conduct previously prohibited in express terms to include
private acts performed in accordance with state statutes which merely
codified existing common law. 26 In fact, the rationale of Adams is
consistent with the reasoning expressed by the Reitman dissenters:
By focusing on "encouragement" the Court... is forging a slippery
and unfortunate criterion by which to measure the constitutionality
of a statute simply permissive in purpose and effect, and inoffensive
on its face.
A moment of thought will reveal the far-reaching possibilities
... which I am sure the Court does not intend. Every act of private
discrimination is either forbidden by state law or permitted by it.
There can be little doubt that such permissiveness-whether by
express constitutional or statutory provision... to some extent
"encourages" those who wish to discriminate to do so. Under this
theory "state action" in the form of laws that do nothing more than
passively permit could be said to tinge all private discrimination
with the taint of unconstitutional state encouragement.
* .. [S]tate action required to bring the Fourteenth Amendment
into operation must be affirmative and purposeful, actively fostering
discrimination. Only in such a case is ostensibly "private" action
more properly labelled "official."
(2) Moreover, the Adams court viewed the codification of prejudgment
self-help remedies as founded upon "economically reasoned grounds
25 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Reitman].
26 CCH SEc. TRANS. GUiDE 52,216 at 67,312.
2 7 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 393-395.
[Vol. 7:2
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RECENT CASES
of very long standing"28 as opposed to the Reitman legislation which
reflected a legislative intent "to authorize ... conduct that would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment."2
Secondly, the Ninth Circuit was unable to detect any form of
"symbiotic relationship" 3 0 between the state and the bank from which
action under color of state law could be inferred. Relying on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis,31 the Adams
court refused to find sufficient state involvement in the acts of the bank
solely due to compliance with the California version of the Code. In the
Moose Lodge case, the Court refined a previous broad holding in Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority32 and announced that state action is not
found when the state merely possesses a noninfluential connection with a
private person or organization, or when the state lacks some sort of causal
relationship to the private action examined, but only when the state has
"sufficiently involved"33 itself with private activities. It is obvious that
the Adams court did not feel mere compliance by a private entity to
a state statute codifying a common-law remedy met this higher standard.
Thirdly, the Adams court could not conclude that the exercise
of the traditional prejudgment remedy of repossession represented the
private execution of a function which otherwise in all likelihood would
be performed by the state.34 In distinguishing Adams from earlier
28Adams at 61,312; accord, Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 731-32 (D. Colo.
1972). See also, e.g., Krahmer, Clifford, and Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process
and the Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 23 (1972)
for an excellent discussion of the practical implications of Fuentes and the lower
court holding in Adams.
29 Adams at 67,312. For differing views as to the presence of state action in apparent
private conduct, compare Fuentes; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)
and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972); Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 928 (1973); and Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F.
Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3OAdams at 67,313. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961) (racial discrimination by a private lessee of state-held property held to
constitute sufficient state action to invoke fourteenth amendment protection) with
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (racial discrimination by private
club possessing state liquor license held not to represent sufficient state involvement
necessary to invoke constitutional guarantees).
31407 U.S. 163 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Moose Lodge].
32365 U.S. 715 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Burton]; cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970).
33407 U.S. at 172-73. See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)
("... a State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party when the
State, by its law, has compelled the act.") (emphasis added).
34CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,313. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Magro v. Lentini Brothers
Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Lucas v. Wiscon-
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cases held subject to this test, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly cited
significant state involvement as the crucial criterion and again failed
to find it in the instant case.
Lastly, but nonetheless of great significance, the Ninth Circuit was
able to distinguish Fuentes as not applicable to the contractual agreement
in Adams: "We do not read Fuentes so broadly that it encompasses
all private actions between individuals pursuant to their consensual
undertakings." 35 Apparently the Adams court is not willing to extend the
Sniadach-Fuentes rationale to private acts performed by creditors in
accordance with contractual agreements executed without request for state
help and without direct action or review by state officials. Here viewing
the bank's power to repossess as arising from the security agreement and
not the Code, the Ninth Circuit appears to have followed reasoning
similar to that expressed in the Fuentes' dissenting opinion: "It would
appear that creditors could withstand attack under today's opinion by
making clear in the controlling credit instruments that they may retake
possession without hearing, or, for that matter, without resort to
judicial process at all."' 3 6
The crux of Adams concerns the nature of "substantial" state
involvement-an issue for which there appears to be no simple resolution.
The reasoning of Reitman, where state action was found in a constitutional
amendment which permitted discrimination, seems easily extended to
Adams-type situations where, arguably, at least, the Code encourages
private acts which may have been refrained from in the absence of its
passage by the state. Under the Reitman rationale, it would be an
apparently short extension (perhaps no extension at all) to embrace
self-help repossession under the Code as within the purview of the
fourteenth amendment.
Yet while such a rationale clearly indicates pleasing "social-
consciousness" results, it also embodies conceivably dangerous legal
implications within a precarious extension of due process by endorsement
of the oft-scorned rigid guideline for the assessment of state involvement
in ostensibly private action. Due to the apparent inability to derive an
infallible test for the detection of state action, the better view endows
prior "state action" decisions with only limited precedential value. While
guiding principles for the detection of state action are not without merit,
the determination of any such involvement must be, by necessity, a
subjective and flexible procedure, for it is well settled that the creation of
any precise formula for the detection of state action would be an
impossible task.37 Time and again, the Supreme Court has emphasized
35CCH SEc. TRs. GuIDE 52,216 at 67,316; accord, cases cited note 4, supra.
36 407 U.S. at 102.
37 See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
[Vol. 7:2
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that the presence of state action within ostensibly private activity "can be
determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances
present."8 Mindful of this caveat, the Ninth Circuit apparently recognizes
the potentially dangerous precedent that would arise from an affirmation
of the district court's rationale in Adams: by the creation of an inflexible
rule from the specialized facts of Reitman, state action could then be
attributed to private actions consistent with, although not necessarily
encouraged or fostered by, state law. The impropriety of an extension of
the recognition of state action within private action for which there
has not been shown any direct, active, or significant state encouragement
or involvement is obvious: "To say ... that all human behavior which
conforms to statutory requirements is 'State action' or is 'under color of
State law' would far exceed not only what the framers of the Civil Rights
Act ever intended but common sense as well." (Emphasis added).39 The
Adams court wisely applies the "significant involvement" test recently
announced by the Court in Moose Lodge, thereby endorsing a state action
standard possessing the semantic flexibility necessary to avoid absurd
future decisions which could result from a strict application of Reitman.
The Impact of Adams: Questions, Not Answers
Yet instead of answering a legal question with any degree of finality,
the Adams decision, in actuality, only focuses upon a host of constitutional
problems which appear destined to avoid conclusive determination until
considered and definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. A variety
of unresolved issues indicate that the determination of the status of
self-help repossession is far from resolved.
First, it is not at all determined whether self-help repossession is
(1) a common law remedy for which mere codification by state enactment
arguably fails to represent sufficient state action, or (2) a statutory remedy
reflecting a pervasive state policy encouraging private unconstitutional
acts. Many who would classify self-help repossession as outside the
fourteenth amendment are quick to indicate that state action can not
properly be attributed to that which is essentially a common-law remedy:
"It cannot be that codifying a generally understood practice of ancient
and honorable lineage and surrounding it with safeguards renders the
practice unconstitutional." 40 However, there is authority which asserts
38 365 U.S. at 72&
39 Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see, e.g., cases
cited note 4 supra; see also Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, 466 F.2d
638, 647 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 928 (1973) ("It is by no means
clear that 'state inaction' is equivalent to 'state action' for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes.").
40 Mentschikoff, supra note 13, at 785; see also, e.g., 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1 (1965); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MALAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 574 (2d ed. 1899).
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that the procedures codified in Code sections 9-503 and 9-504 can not
justifiably be classified as common law remedies.41 Indeed, it is argued that
since the Code gives broad authorization of acceleration clauses,42
eliminates the election of remedies doctrine,43 limits damages for wrongful
repossession, 44 and permits repossession even in the absence of a
contractual clause expressly providing such a remedy, 45 the pro-creditor
provisions of the Code go beyond merely authorizing private self-help
and actually get the state deeply involved in expanding the right of
repossession. This reasoning reaches the inevitable conclusion that
self-help repossession in conformity with Article Nine must be considered
action under color of state law.46
Secondly, classifications of self-help repossession as beyond the scope
of the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment have rested
upon varying rationales. Some courts have held that peaceful repossession
is a private creditor's remedy which lacks sufficient state action.47 Others
have determined that constitutional guarantees are unnecessary since
consent to contractual agreements containing self-help repossession
provisions evidences a waiver of these rights.48 Naturally enough, if
self-help repossession is held to be outside of the scope of the fourteenth
amendment, the underlying rationale of any such future decision by the
Court would be crucial. Under the former theory, prejudgment seizure of
the collateral by private act would always be constitutional regardless
of the incorporation of any repossession provision within the contractual
agreement. However under the latter rationale, it may be reasonably
inferred that absent this waiver by contract, similar consistent judicial
reasoning would be forced to classify self-help repossession within the
41 There is legal authority to support the argument that the Code, as legislation with
significant pro-creditor bias, can not properly qualify as a mere codification of
common law principles. See, e.g., Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond:
The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 U. VA. L. REv. 355 (1973); Clark, Default,
Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld and a
Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302 (1972).
4 2 See, e.g., UCC § 3-109(1)(c) (the presence of an acceleration clause does not
affect negotiability of instrument). Compare UCC § 1-208 with UCC § 1-201(19)
("good faith" provision requires attacker to show lack of honesty in fact-a
subjective burden of proof).
43 UCC § 9-501.
44 Compare UCC § 9-503 with UCC § 9-501(3) (What is a "breach of the peace"?).
45 UCC § 9-503.
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
47 5ee, e.g., Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene v. First
Natl. Exchange Bank of Virginia, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank
of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors Inc., 121
N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
48 See McCormick v. First National Bank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla.
1971); see generally, D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb
v. Lennox 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (waiver of due process requirements must be
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made).
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scope of the fourteenth amendment. The differing implications resulting
from a Supreme Court adoption of either view are, of course, obvious.
Lastly, assuming aguendo that the Supreme Court concludes that
peaceful repossession is beyond the scope of the fourteenth amendment, it
would seem only a matter of time until related issues concerning the
constitutional rights of debtors and creditors acting "under color of state
law" arise. Consider the problems inherent in a creditor's action for a
deficiency judgment: Are the contemporary statutory extensions of in
personam jurisdiction which endow creditors with increased judicial scope
sufficient state action to invoke due process requirements? What about
state rule changes concerning venue? Are these legislative enactments suffi-
cient state action by rule change to compel a result different from Adams?
49
CONCLUSION
Perhaps only one certainty arises from the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Adams: The entire area of law which is touched by the issue of state
action and self-help repossession is destined to be plagued by uncertainty
and conflicting views until Adams or a similar case is heard by the
Supreme Court. An enlightening decision by the Court not only could
make more definite what is currently conceived as the uneasy balance
of rights between debtors and creditors but also could provide sharper
insight into the more pervasive legal problems of assessing "substantiality"
of state involvement in acts by private entities.
The Court's recent holding in Moose Lodge may well evidence a
retreat from a seemingly logical and broad application of the prima facie
implications of Reitman, Burton, and others. 50 Yet in light of the many
problems raised by the issue in Adams as well as the varying rationales
presented for its resolution, speculation as to any future Court decision
in this area of the law can hardly be made with any degree of
49 Arguments supporting the existence of sufficient state action to invoke fourteenth
amendment protection are discussed in a brief for defendant's motion to quash service
in G.M.A.C. v. Wilson, Civil No. 507118 (Akron Mun. Ct., filed Oct. 14, 1972).
50 Compare Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (estate administration of discrimi-
natory will provision) and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (shopping
center owners' fifth amendment rights balanced against protesters' first amendment
rights) with Moose Lodge. Taken together, these three cases indicate that the Court
may well resolve future "state action/private action" conflicts with a type of balancing
test. See also Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Note
25 VAND. L. REv. 1237, 1244 (1972).
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certainty.51 Nonetheless an appreciation of the trend in recent Supreme
Court decisions in this as well as an understanding of the current
composition of the Court52 increases the probability that peaceful
repossession under the Code will be held constitutional.
DAVID M. HUNTER
51 Legal authority concerning Adams-type problems is divided. Some writers urge
Court affirmation of the Ninth Circuit rationale. See generally, e.g., R. HENSON,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 10-18 at 264
(1973); Mentschikoff, supra note 13; J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMER-
CLAL CODE § 26-6 at 974 (1972). But see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and
Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 U. VA. L. REv. 355, 377 (1973);
McDonnell, Sniadach, the Replevin Cases and Sell-Help Repossession-Due Process
Tokenism? 14 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 437, 450 (1973); Note, Constitutional
Torts: Section 1983 Redress for the Deprived Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627,
648 (1973).
52 If and when repossession under UCC 9-503 is heard by the Supreme Court, Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, who did not sit for Fuentes, may very well join the Fuentes
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